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THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AND STATE JURISDICTION
OVER LABOR RELATIONS

Russell A. Smith*

A

FEW months ago a California union defended a state court suit
against it by asserting, inter alia, that, since the union's activities affected interstate commerce, and were of a kind covered by the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (commonly called the TaftHartley Act) 1 the state court was without jurisdiction to enforce state
law with respect to the subject matter. Judge Shepard, of the Superior
. Court bench, ruled that " ..• while this Court does retain jurisdiction to hear and determine the damage phase of this case ... [in
view of the authority express~y conferred by section 303 of the federal
act] and does have certain injunctive powers where violations of the
public peace are concerned, nevertheless, generally speaking, the injunctive power of this Court is largely superseded as to said Local 39
by that of the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts
because of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947." 2
Of the many problems arising out of the Taft-Hartley Act, not
the least perplexing is the determination of its impact upon state jurisdiction over labor relations. The importance of the question is obvious,
and is illustrated by Judge Shepard's reaction. Administrators of state
labor relations acts and state courts, like the• California court, must
determine what position to take with respect to their jurisdiction. Employers and unions· must make a like determination, and must also
come to some conclusion as to the applicability of state law as reflected
in other statutes and in judicial decisions. Those charged with the
administration of the federal act must attempt to measure the scope
of their authority and the limits of their discretion.

* Professor of Law,

University of Michigan.
P.L. 101, 80th Cong., 1st sess., c. 120.
2
Ensher, Alexander and Barsoom, Incorporated v. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable
Workers Union, (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno County, Sept. 10, 1947) 13 Lab. Cas.
§ 64,051.
1
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The answers to some questions in this area are clear; in most cases,
however, the act is not definitive and presents difficult problems of construction. It is proposed herein to outline the problems involved and
to advance a basis for their solution.

Some Policy Premises
Jurisdiction to control labor relations in the public interest is just
one aspect of the highly important and delicate dilemma of governmental authority posed by our federal system. Presumably, the federal
government may preempt a field of regulation which is within its constitutional powers, which means that the controlling question is Congressional intent. Often this intent is not expressed. One who purports
to find an intent not clearly expressed-to reveal the unr~vealedwill inevitably be influenced by his notions as to what repr~ents good
or bad policy. Candor requires the statement that it has been and remains the conviction of the writer that in general it would be unwise to
attempt to provide through federal legislation, at the expense of state
power, a single, uniform, preclusive treatment of labor relations problems. This judgment is based not so much on a philosophical opposition
to centralized power as on the belief that in labor relations this
country has as yet neither the theoretical nor the practical foundation
for concluding that any one code or system of regulations shall universally prevail.
It is worth recalling that the state legislatures and state courts have
had a long, interesting anq. varied experience with labor relations problems. 3 Some-policies adopted have been condemned as "reactionary,"
others as too "radical" ( as witness the abortive Kansas experiment of
the 'twenties with compulsory arbitration) .4 In any case almost every
aspect of the subject has been touched. In recent times certain states
have led the way in revising their "little Wagner" acts to provide for
coverage of practices of unions and employees, as well as of employers,G
and it is probable that these statutes had considerable influence in the
3

'

See Smith and DeLancey, "The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 MICH.
L. REV. 987 (1940); and comment, 42 ILL. L. REv. 505 (1947).
4
See Wolff Packing Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522,
43 S.Ct. 630 (1923), and Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 44 S.Ct. 323 (1924).
5
The states of Colorado [Acts (1943) c. 131], Michigan [Acts (1939) No.
176], Minnesota [Acts (1939) c. 43-9], Pennsylvania [Laws (1937) No. 294, as
amended by Laws (1939) No. 162] and Wisconsin [Laws (1939) c. 111] began
the movement. Many others have joined the procession, either with amendments of
their labor relations acts or with statutes directed at certain specific practices or objects.
See 42 ILL. L. REv. 505 (1947).
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shaping of the Taft-Hartley Act. Now we are witnessing a pioneering
state movement in the direction of special treatment of labor disputes
in the public utility industries.6 State law is likely to be more immediately responsive to prevailing public sentiment than is federal law.
In this area of.human relations especially it would seem to be eminently
desirable to retain the possibility of local expression, which, on the
legislative plane, operates, like plant grievance procedures, as an important modulator of local stresses and strains. Moreover, to cut off
this opportunity, would be to make an unwarranted assumption as to
the ultimate wisdom of federal labor legislation and to deprive the
nation of valuable pragmatic lessons which can be learned if the possibilities for social experimentation uniquely presented by our federal
system are fully exploited. Those who contend that the states are no
longer genuine laboratories for such experimentation and that they
have shown their unwillingness or incompetency to deal with social
problems are hardly, supported by the record.7
6
Fourteen states have special legislation on this subject. For a summary of such
legislation see "State Regulation of Labor Unions," 42 ILL. L. REv. 505 at 516-517
(1947).
1 It should suffice to cite only a few instances of vigorous state action to show
that the state legislative process has not yet become sterile: (1) In the area of commerce-the states continue, through the laws dealing with corporations, partnerships
and proprietorships, as important regulators of business transactions; the local power
to tax still exists and is exercised freely and with little federal restraint; most of the
states have statutes more or less stringently regulating the issue and distribution of
corporate securities, despite federal regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 [48
Stat. L. 74 at 85, 15 U.S.C. (1940) §_ 77s] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[ 49 Stat. L. 13 So, 15 U.S.C. ( 1940) § 78a et seq.] ; the states have undertaken to deal
with the problems of the small loan business; fraud on creditors is the subject of more or
less extensive treatment, both under common law and statutory principles; insurance enterprises are subjected to extensive regulation, as are local utilities and banks; the problem of "fair trade" has been the subject of special treatment in the "Fair Trade
Acts," to such an extent that Congress in 1937 felt constrained to amend the Sherman
Act to bring federal policy into conformity with state policy [Miller-Tydings Act, 50
Stat. L. 693, 15 U.S.C. (1940) § I et seq.]; (2) in the area of labor legislation-the statute books of the states contain a wide variety of very specific regulations covering almost the entire gamut, including regulations as to hours of employment, use of
female and child labor, workmen's compensation, health and sanitation, wage assignments, credit unions, and so forth, as well as regulations of the employer-union relationship; (3) in the area of domestic relations-the states, despite some agitation for
national uniformity of policy in certain matters, still set the legal standards which
govern the family.
It is true that the federal government in the Roosevelt era to some extent took
the initiative from the states with respect to social legislation. But even as to subject
matter covered by the "new deal" statutes the states have done the pioneering in some
instances. This is true, for example of "blue sky'' legislation, provisions for debtor
relief in times of depression, e.g., the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act of 1933
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Before these comments are concluded it will be necessary to-make
some reference to the position hitherto taken by the Supreme Court
in attempting to reconcile national and state inter.ests in this and other
fields of regulation. It may be noted appropriately at the outset, however, that on more than 'one occasion the Court has quite properly, as
the writer believes, indicated a general reluctance to treat federal legislation as having been intended to dislodge state authority. Mr. Justice
Van Devanter stated in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission: "In construing federal statutes enacted under the power
conferred by the commerce clause of the Constitution . . . it should
never be held that Congress intends to supersede or suspend the exercise of the reserved powers of a State, even where that may be done,
unless, and except so far as, its purpose to do so is clearly manifested." 8
Again, in dealing with state legislation seeking to control livestock
disease, the Court said in Mintz v. Baldwin: "The purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state action against the ravages of the
[Bang's] disease is not lightly to be inferred. The intention so to do
[Minn. Laws (1933) c. 339], oil conservation policies [see,Ford, "Controlling the
Production of Oil," 30 MICH. L. REv. II70 (1932) ], housing and slum clearance
projects [see Ebenstein, "The Law of Public Housing," 23 MINN. L. REv. 879
(1939) ], and, as an example of state action, the Municipal Housing Authorities Law
of New York, (New York Laws (1934) c. 4], acreage limitations and other pre-AAA
agricultural relief measures (see So UNiv. PA. L. REv. 436 (1932) ], and a wide
range of unemployment relief activities [ see Burns, "Relation of Unemployment Compensation to the Broader Problem of Relief," 3 L. AND CoNTEMP. PRoB. 150 (1936) ].
Lest it be thought that all of the forces of "progressivism" are centered in Washington, it should be. remembered that some of the states have undertaken social. reforms which Congress has, as yet, failed to adopt. Examples are the Fair Employment
Practice statutes of New York (Laws (1945) c. 292, p. 676], Massachusetts (Acts
(1946) c. 368], New Jersey (Laws (1945) _c. 169] and Connecticut (Laws (1947)
.Pub. Act 171], and the recent state attempts to substitute compulsory arbitration for
the strike and lockout in the public utility industries (see note 6, supra).
The writer may perhaps be accused of inconsistency, since in 1936 and 1937,
while faced in private practice with the inconveniences of multi-state regulations of
securities transactions, he advocated that the states should not attempt to duplicate
the regulatory function exercised by the federal government (see Smith, "State 'BlueSky' Laws and the Federal Securities Acts," 34 MICH. L. REv. II35 (1936), and
- Smith, "The Relation of Federal and State Securities Laws," 4 L. AND CoNTEMP.
PROB. 241 (1937)]. There may well be differences in the degree of impact of state
regulations on interstate commerce in this as compared with the labor relations field
such as to justify a different treatment of the problem of state power in the two cases.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that the writer's views with respect to "blue
sky" legislation would now be different, upon consideration, than they were ten
years ago. There is, of course, the highest judicial autliority in support of the maxim
that there is no particular virtue in consistency.
8
245 U.S. 493 at 510, 38 S.Ct. 170 (1918).
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must definitely and clearly appear." 11 And Chief Justice Hughes
pointed out in Kelly v. Washington that "the application of the principle is strongly fortified where the State exercises its power to protect
the lives and the health of its people." 10 State legislation with respect
to some phases of labor relations-especially those related to the health
and safety of workers, protections of persons and property against acts
of violence and protection of freedom to seek employment opportunities-is a traditional and highly important state funttion-which should
not be discarded except for compelling reasons.

I
THE PERTINENT PRov1s10Ns oF THE FEDERAL AcT

We must, of course, begin with an examination of those provisions
of the Labor Management Relations Act, r 947 (LMRA) which
touch on the subject of state jurisdiction. Reference to state action are
to be found in sections 8(d), ro(a), 13, 14(a) and 14(b) of Title I,
which enacts an amended National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
in section 203 (b) of Title II arid in section 303 of Title III. Section 8 ( d) contemplates that the parties to a contract modification or
termination dispute shall give notice thereof to the state mediation
agency, if any. Section ro(a) provides that the power of the National
Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices under the
amended NLRA shall not be "affected" by any other means of adjustment, but authorizes the board to "cede" jurisdiction, subject to certain
limitations, to state agencies. Section I 3 provides, among other things,
that the act is not intended to affect any limitations or qualifications on
the right to strike. Section 14(a) says that no other law, national or
local, shall operate to require employers subject to the federal act to
give supervisors bargaining rights. Section 14(b) expressly preserves
state freedom to impose more severe limitations on the use of union
security agreements than are contained in the federal act. Section
203 (b) directs the newly created Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service to stay out of minor disputes jf state mediation is available. And
section 303 provides for a damage reµiedy in the federal and state
courts for injuries suffered as a result of secondary boycotts and other
federally proscribed kinds of union conduct.
It is significant that none of these provisions contains a clear, comprehensive delineation of the subject matter either preempted by Con289 U.S. 346 at 350, 53 S.Ct. 6n (1933).
302 U.S. 1 at 13, 58 S.Ct. 87 (1937).

9
10
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gress or shared with the states. The statute does not, like the Serurities Act of 1933,11 the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,12 and the
original United States Warehouse Act,13 give a clear green light to
the states, nor on the other hand, does it, like the Railway Labor Act,14
fail to provide any signal at all. Rather, it contains a kind of incomplete book of traffic rules, some specific, some vague. Some lanes are
clearly open to the states; others are as clearly closed. But many roads
are unmarked or ·marked with confusing signs, making it necessary
for the traveler to rely upon some general compass bearing in order
to be able to proceed.

(1) Some Details Which Are More Or Less Clear
Union Security Provisions. Section 14(b) of the amended NLRA
provides:

·

"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State
or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited
by State or Territorial law."
The legislative history of this provision confirms what is apparent
on its face that Congr~ss thereby desired to make clear its intent to
leave the states free to deal with union security provisions, provided
state action is not less restrictive than the federal act.15 The draftsmen
11
Section 18 of the act provides that "nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission ( or any agency or office performing like functions)
of any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any
security or any person." 48 Stat. L. 74, 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1940) § 77r.
12
Section 18 of the act provides as follows: "No provision of this Act or of any
order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this Act or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek
established under this Act, and no provisions of this Act relating to the employment
of child labor shall justify noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal
ordinance establishing a higher standard than the standard established under this
Act•••• " 52 Stat. L. 1060 at 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 218. ·
18 The Act of 1916 (39 Stat. L.,490) provided: " . . . Nothing in this chapter
shall be constru~d to conflict with, or to authorize any conflict with, or in any way
to impair or limit the effect or operation of the laws of any State relating to warehouses, warehousemen, weighers, inspectors, samplers, or classifiers. . • • "
14
44 Stat. L. 577 (1926), as amended by 48 Stat. L. 926, u85 (1934); 45
u.s.c.15 (1940) c. 8.
In the Conference Committee Report to accompany H.R. 3020 (June 3,
U:)47) appears the following:
"Under the House bill there was included a new section 13 of the National
Labor Relations Act to assure that nothing in the act was to be construed as authorizing
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simply wanted to make sure that the uncertainty as to state authority
which,-for SO!l}-e inexplicable reason, existed under the original NLRA
should not obtain under the act as amended. The amended NLRA
outlaws the· closed shop as a form of discrimination, but permits the
union shop under certain conditions. There is no question but that the
states are not bound to tolerate even the union shop. They may, if they
so desire, adopt the federal policy which applies under the Railway
Labor Act and thus prohibit both the closed and the union shop. Or,
they may permit the union shop, but on conditions more restrictive
than those provided by the amended NLRA. This is true, of course,
whether the state imposes the limitations by legislation or by judicial
decision.16
Supervisory Employees. Section r4( a) of the amended NLRA
operates, on the other hand, as an absolute limitation on the authority
of the states to require employers subject to the act to accord bargaining
rights to supervisory employees. The provision reads:
"Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a
supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor
organization, but no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any state law, either national or local,
relating to collective bargaining."
By this provision Congress not only repudiated for federal purposes the old National Labor Relations Board's doctrine of the Packard
any closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership, or other form of compulsory
unionism agreement in any State where the execution of such agreement would be contrary to State law. Many States have enacted laws or adopted constitutional provisions to
make all forms of compulsory unionism in those States illegal. It was never the intention
of the National'Labor Rel~tions Act, as is disclosed by the legislative history of that
act, to preempt the field in this regard so as to deprive the States of their powers to
prevent compulsory unionism. Neither the so-called 'closed shop' proviso in section
8 (3) of the existing act nor the union shop and maintenance of membership proviso in
section 8 (a) (3) of the conference agreement could be said to authorize arrangements
of this sort in States where such arrangements were contrary to the State policy. To make
certain that there should be no question about this, section 13 was included in the
House bill. The conference agreement, in section 14(b), contains a provision having
the same effect." H. Rep. 5 IO, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 60.
16
It is not int~nded in what is stated in the text to .express any opinion on the
constitutionality of state restrictions upon compulsory unionism, but only to indicate
the legal status of such restrictions so far as federal legislation is concerned. Unions
commonly regard state attempts to outlaw compulsory unionism as unconstitutional
deprivations of liberty of contract. For a recent decision upholding the North Carolina
"right to work" statute of 1947, insofar as it invalidates contracts requiring union
membership as a condition of employment, see North Carolina v. Whitaker, 21 LAB.
REL. REF. MAN. 2156 (1947).
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case,17 but also established a uniform, national policy with respect to
the bargaining rights of supervisory emplqyees of el?-pioyers whose
activities affect interstate commerce. The result is that the collective
bargaining position of such employees is to be determined by the parties
themselves, not by law. This restores the situation to the status quo
ante the original NLRA.
State Restrictions on Strike Action. Section 13 of the amended
NLRA,. reads:
·
"Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations
or qualifications on that right."
The first part of this provision is irrelevant to our present problem. The emphasized portion may be pertinent. It may be read as
leaving the states free to impose such limitations on strike action as
they shall deem to be necessary. On the other hand, Congress may
have sought by this section only to leave unimpaired those indirect
sanctions on improper strike action which had been worked out in the
form of ·a denial of the privileges of the original NLRA in the Fansteel,18 American News 19 and Sands 20 cases. The· legislative history
shows that the draftsmen had the latter purpose in mind, but it does
not show whether they regarded this as a minimum or maximum objective.21 It is perhaps not.unreasonable to suggest, however, that if
at this point they were thinking of the major problem of state restric17 Packard Motor Car Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), enforced, NLRB v.
Packard Motor Car Company, (C.C.A. "6th, 1946) 157 F. (2d) So, affd., 330 U.S.
485, 67 ·s.Ct. 789 (1947).
18 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490 (1939).
19 The American News Company, Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
20 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508 (1939).
21 The Senate Committee Report on S. l l 26, section l 3 of which was as incorporated in the final enactment, contains the following:
.
"Section 1 3 has been amended in two respects: ( l) By a clause which makes
clear that the W agney Act has diminished the right to strike only to the extent specifically provided by the new amendments to the act; (2) by the addition of the
words 'to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.'
"It should be noted that the Board has construed the present act as denying any
remedy to employees· striking for illegal objectives. (See American News Co., 55
N.L.R.B. 1302, and Thompson Products, 72 N.L.R.B. 150.) The Supreme Court
has interpreted the statute as not conferring protection upon employees who strike
in breach of contract (N.L.R.B. o. Sands Manufacturing Company, 306 U.S. 332);
or in breach of some other Federal law (Southern Steamship Company o. NL.R.B.,
316 U.S. 31); or who engage in illegal acts while on strike (Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp. o. N.L.R.B., 306 U.S. 240).
"This bill is not intended to change in any respect existing law as construed
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tions on union conduct, they would have been ·careful to use language
which would leave their intention clear. On the whole we must probably put the section down as r1mbiguous, although the lawyer could
hardly be charged with negligence if he should take the section at its
face value and conclude that state power to deal with strikes remains
unimpaired. .
State Mediation. There is no question but that the states are
left free to employ the technique of mediation with respect to some
categories, at least, of labor disputes involving employers subject to
the LMRA. Section 8 ( d) of the amended NLRA requires that notice
of contract termination or modification disputes shall be given not
only to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, but also to
"any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate
disputes. . . ." And section 203 (b) of Title II of the LMRA directs
the Federal Service "to avoid atte}Ilpting to mediate disputes which
would have only a minor effect on interstate commerce if State or other
conciliation services are available to the parties." These provisions are
meaningful only if it is intended that·the state services shall be free
to intervene at least to the extent indicated.22
State Court Jurfsdiction to Try Damage Actions. Section 303 (b)
in these administrative and judicial decisions." S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p.
28.
The Report of the Conference Committee on H.R. 3020 contains the following:
"Section 13 of the existing National Labor Relations Act provides that nothing
in the act "is to be construed so as to either interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike. Under the House bill, in section 12(e), a provision was
included to the effect that except as specifically provided in section 12 nothing in the
act should be so construed. Under the Senate amendment, in section 13, section I 3
of the existing law was rewritten so as to provide that except as specifically provided
for in the act, nothing was to be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike. The Senate amendment also added one
other important provision to this section, providing that nothing in the act was to
affect the limitations or qualifications on the right to strike, thus recognizing that
the right to strike is not an unlimited and unqualified right. The conference agreement
adopts the provisions of the Senate amendment." .H. Rep. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 3, 1947, P· 59•
22
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service on September 28, 1947,
issued a release which set forth the principles which will guide the Service with respect
to the exercise of its authority. Among the principles stated are the following:
"2. Congress obviously anticipated that labor disputes, primarily local in consequence and concern, and having but a minor effect upon interstate commerce, should
be conciliated and mediated, if need be, by agencies of State or local government where
they are in a position to make effective services of that character available to the parties.
The Federal Service will cooperate fully with such agencies. The Regional Directors
of this Service with the advice and assistance of the Washington office will develop
procedures which will facilitate such cooperation and assure the fulfillment of the
Congressional purpose." C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv., § 90oz.
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of Title III· of the LMRA provides a damage remedy in the federal
district courts and "in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties" for violations of the provisions of section 303(a) making unlawful certain kinds of union collective action. This provision, of course,
does not per se shed light on the problem we are considering, but
it does serve to indicate that Congress did not intend to set up an
exclusive system of federal remedies.

(2) The Meaning of Section IO(a)
The most important and latently ambiguous of the specific references in the LMRA to state action i~ that contained in section rn(a)
of the amended NLRA, which provides:
. "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed
in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided,
That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of
any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over
any cases in any industry ( other than mining, manufacturing,
communications, and transportation except where predominantly
local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affectjng commerce, unless the provision of the State or
Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases
by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision
of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith."
,. It will be observed that the newly constituted National Labor
Relations Board is given express authority to "cede" jurisdiction over
any cases of which it has jurisdiction under the amended NLRA ·subject to two exceptions. First, it may not do so if the applicable portion
of the state statute is inconsistent with the federal act. Second, it may
not ·do so in any event in the mining, manufacturing, communications
or transportation fields unless the situation can be brought within the
"predominantly local in character" category. There is a question
whether this latter category is to be determined by reference to the
industry ( the employer) or to the particular case, but the legislative
record makes it fai-rly clear that the criterion is the character of the
employer's operations, not the nature of the case.23 Hereinafter referThe complete statement in the Conference Committee Report on Section 10(-a)
reads as follows:
"Both the House bill and the Senate amendment in section Io provided, as does
section 10 of the present act, for the prevention of unfair labor practices. The House
23

.
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ence is made to the non-local mining, manufacturing, communications
and transportation industries, as to which there may be no cession of
jurisdiction, as the "major industries" and to the remainder as the
"minor industries." 24
There are several possible constructions which may be given to
section rn(a). First, it may be contended that Congress thereby indicated its intention to preempt completely the fields of regulation
entered by the amended NLRA, with the following exceptions: ( 1) tbe
case of the minor industries to the extent that jurisdiction is specifically
and properly ceded by the NLRB; (2) the reservations to the states
made in sections 13 and 14, discussed supra; 25 and (3) the necessarily
bill, by reason in part of division of functions between the Board and the Administrator
provided for therein, completely recast the procedure in section 10. It also made a
number of other important changes, as did the Senate amendment. The treatment under
the conference agreement of the provisions in the House bill relating to the Administrator have already been discussed. The other matters dealt with in section IO of the
House bill and the Senate amendment are treated as follows:
"(1) The House bill omitted from section 1o(a) of the existing law the
language providing that the Board's power to deal with unfair labor practices should
not be affected by other means of adjustment or prevention, but it retained the
language of the present act which makes the Board's jurisdiction exclusive. The
Senate amendment, because of its provisions authorizing temporary injunctions enjoining alleged unfair labor practices and because of its provisions making unions suable,
omitted the language giving the Board exclusive jurisdiction of unfair labor practices,
but retained that which provides that the Board's power shall not be affected by
other means of adjustment or prevention. The conference agreement adopts the provisions of the Senate amendment. By retaining the language which provides the
Board's powers under section 10 shall not be affected by other means of adjustment,
the conference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies exist, one before the
Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the Board shall be in addition
to, and not in lieu of, other remedies.
"(2) The Senate amendment contained a proviso at the end of section IO(a)
authorizing the Board to cede jurisdiction over any cases in any industry to State and
Territorial agencies, subject to two conditions: (a) That it can cede jurisdiction in
cases arising in mining, manufacturing, communications and transportation only when
the employer's operations are predominantly local in character, and (b) that it may
cede jurisdiction only if the applicable provisions of the National Act, as interpreted
and applied by the Board and by the courts. The House bill contained no provision
corresponding with the proviso of section 10(a) of the Senate amendment. The conference agreement adopts this proviso." H. Rep. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., June 3,
1947, p. 52.
24
It is recognized, of course, that there may be industries of substantial size whose
operations are predominantly local in character in the manufacturing, mining, communications and transportations fields, as to which the board may have authority to
cede jurisdiction; also that not every "major" industry is in one of these fields. The
short-hand delineation of the concessionary authority of the board, used in the text,
is obviously therefore somewhat inaccurate.
25
The recent decision in Rothenberg v. Kelley, (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Spec. Term,
Part I, Dec. 18, 1947) 21 LAB. REL. REP. MAN. 2142, may have been based on this
construction of the act, although the brief opinion in the case does not disclose the
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implied reservation of state power to protect person and property
agmnst acts of violence. This would mean that the police power of the
states is suspended as to employer and union interferences with the
"right" of self-organization and as to union collective action except
to the extent that jurisdiction is expressly ceded by the NLRB .as to
local industries, and except to impose restrictions on the use of union
security provisions, to preserve the peace and, possibly, to impose general limitations on the "right" to strike. The word "possibly" as to
restrictions. on strike action is used advisedly, since, if this construction
should be placed upon section rn(a), the ambiguity in section 13 might
very well be resolved against the existence of state power.
At the other extreme it may be contended that Congress did not,
by section Io( a), intend to indicate preemption in any respect, but
only to give express approval to the practice already started by the
board under the original NLRA of making practical, working arrangements with state boards under which persons interested could be clear
as to the jurisdiction of the state boards to enforce under state laws, as
to certain designated industries, policies comparable with those of the
federal act. 26 Under this view the question of the applicability of state
labor relations legislation and common law absent such an arrangement would be· determined in the light of the general principles concerning implied supersedure of state authority which have been used
by the Supreme Court. As will be seen, these concepts are sufficiently
flexible to permit the Court to conclude that the states are free to
enforce regulations additional to and not inconsistent with those of
the federal act, and even regulations comparable with those of the
federal act at least so long as the National Board has not acted in the
case.
A third view is that Congress in section 10(a) indicated its ·in-

~

actual basis of decision. A motion to compel the New York State Labor Relations Board
to assume jurisdiction of charges made by a union against the employer was denied,
where the New York Board had "already dismissed the charges without prejudice to
filing the same with the National Labor Relations Board which had refused to cede
to the respondents jurisdiction over this case affecting interstate commerce.'~
26
See N.L.R.B. Annual Report, 1938, p. 3; also the appendix to the separate
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Board, (U.S. 1947) 67 S.Ct. 1026 at 1035, incorporating copies of the
documents constituting the then existing agreement between the New York and
national boards; also the joint statement by the two boards continuing their policy of
collaboration, despite the Bethlehem decision, reported in I 2 FED. REG, 3443
(May 28, 1947), and the reference to the agreement between the national and
Puerto Rican boards contained in their joint statement published in 12 FED, REG.
7902 (Nov. 25, 1947).
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tention to preempt the field as to the major industries, subject to
certain express or implied exceptions, but not to preempt the field at
all as to the minor industries. The exceptions would be ( 1) any subject matter not touched by the amended NLRA, (2) the implied
authority of the states to preserve the peace, and (3) types of regulations expressly reserved to state authority by sections 13 and 14 of
the act. A possible variant of this interpretation, and hence a fourth
view, is that as to the major industries Congress intended to exclude
all, state regulation in the field of management-union relations, subject,
of course, to exceptions (2) and (3), even as to subject matter not
touched by the federal statute, but to leave the states free to act with
respect to the minor industries.
Granted that each of these constructions of section 1o(a) is possible, does any one of them harmonize more than the others with the
general purposes and the other relevant p~ovisions of the act? There
is no conclusive answer to this question. The first construction-preemption-would render section 14(a), dealing with supervisory employees, redundant, but would give point to sections 13 and 14(b ),
as well as to section 8 ( d )-that is, these provisions would be necessary
if Congress intended, despite general preemption, to leave the states
free to act in certain cases. The second construction-no preemption
at all-would render section 14(b) and, to some extent section 13,
superfluous and, what is more important, would leave the state boards
incongruously free to act even:with respect to the major industries while
permitting the National Board to cede jurisdiction only with respect to
the minor industries. The third construction-preemption, with exceptions, as to the major industries; no preemption as to others-would
give meaning to sections 8(d), 13 and 14(b), as exceptions to general
preemption in the case of the major industries, as well as meaning to
section 14(a) as establishing a uniform national policy with respect
to supervisory employees even in the minor industries. The fourth
construction-preemption, with exceptions, as to the major industries
even to the point of excluding regulation as to matters not touched by
the federal act; no preemption as to the minor industries-would yield
like results in making other provisions of the act meaningful, but
would rest on the dubious assumption that Congress intended to supersede the state police power completely as to management-union relations in the major industries except for those matters specifically reserved. On the whole the third and fourth constructions most consistently coordinate with the other specific references in the act to state
action, but this fact is probably not conclusive. The determination
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of the existence or non-existence of state power should not hang
on so slender a thread. Experience under the original act, the legislative history of the present act and considerations of policy are much
more important.
The Jurisdictional Problem Under the Original NLRA. Section
rn(a) of the original act provided:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent
any P.erson from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall be exclusive,
and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement,
code, law, or otherwise." 21
•
There is no question but that Congress intended by this provision
to make the jurisdiction of the board exclusive, as against other federal
and state agencies, to enforce the substantive provisions of the act.
That is, no other agency could enforce these provisions of federal law.
Howeyer, there is little in the legislative history of the act to suggest
that Congress sought thereby to preempt the :field of managementunion relations as against state action under state policies,28 and clearly
the practical contruction of the act during most of its life did not exclude state jurisdiction. Indeed, the Supreme Court as early as 1938,
in the' Consolidated Edison case, suggested that the NLRB, in deter49 Stat. L. 453, 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 16o(a).
The Senate Committee Report on S. I 9 58 contains the following:
"Section IO(a) gives the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction
to prevent and redress unfair labor practices, and, taken in conjunction with section
14,' establishes clearly that this bill is paramount over other laws that might touch upon
similar subject matters. Thus it is intended to dispel the confusion resulting from
dispersion of authority and to establish a single paramount administrative or quasijudicial authority in connection with the development of the Federal American law
regarding collective bargaining." (Sen. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess., May
1, 1935, p. 15).
Section 14, to which reference was made, did not mention state law, but expressly
made the National Labor Relations Act p:iramount in cases of conflict with the
National Industrial Recovery Act or the federal bankruptcy act.
The House Commi,ttee Report on S. I 9 58 referred to the section in the following
manner: "The Board is empowered, according to the procedure provided in section 10,
to prevent any- person from engaging in any unfair labor practice listed in section 8
'affecting commerce,' as that term is defined in section 2( 7). This power is vested
exclusively in the Board and is not to be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention. The Board is thus made the paramount agency for dealing with the
unfair labor practices described in the bill." (House Rep. No. I 147, 74th Cong., 1st
sess., June 10, 1935, p. 23).
Neither report made any specific reference to state jurisdiction to deal with employer or union labor relations practices under state law.
21

28

J
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mining whether or not in its discretion to take jurisdiction of a given
controversy, might well consider the possibility that the dispute could
be resolved under state law.20 Not until the recent decision in the
Bethlehem case,8° which will be considered presently, was there any
substantial doubt that state boards had concurrent jurisdiction with the
National Board, at least in the absence of National Board action.
The suggestion made in the Edison case was the basis for a rapprochement between the federal and state agencies which, as previously
noted, was carried to the point of negotiated agreements which assigned
to the local agencies the responsibility for handling certain categories
of industries.81 This division of resP,onsibility had practical advantages
in view of the tremendous work load which was thrust upon ( or, more
accurately, assumed by) the National Board because of the ever widening scope of its jurisdiction under the act, all as forcibly pointed out in
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion in the Bethlehem case.
There existed, of course, obvious limits on state authority, apart
from any express statutory limitations. Hill v. Florida 32 held that
29
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc." v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
59 S.Ct. 206 (1938). The question in the case was whether the circuit court of

appeals had correctly upheld the board's assumption of jurisdiction over the Edison
Company. The company urged that, since its operations were predominantly intrastate, and since means were available under the New York "little Wagner" act for
dealing with any unfair labor practices, the national board was without jurisdiction.
The decision upholding the board's jurisdiction was affirmed. With respect to the
question posed as to the bearing of the state statute, the Court, through Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, stated (pp. 223-224):
" ••• It is manifest that the enactment of this state law could not override the
constitutional authority of the Federal Government. The State could not add to or
detract from that authority. But it is also true that where the employers are not
themselves engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and the authority of the National Labor Relations Board is invoked to protect that commerce from interference
or injury arising from the employers' intrastate activities, the question whether the
alleged unfair labor practices do actually threaten interstate or foreign commerce in a
substantial manner is necessarily presented. And in determining that factlrttl question
regard should be had to all the existing circumstances, including the bearing and
effect of any protective action to the same end already taken under state authority.
The justification for the exercise of federal pow.er should clearly appear. Florida v.
United States, 282 U.S. 194, 2n, 212. But the question in such a case would relate
not to the existence of the federal power but to the propriety of its exercise on a
given state of facts.
" • . • For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say that there has been no
exertion of state authority which can be taken to remove the need for the exertion
of federal authority to protect interstate and foreign commerce."
80
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, (U.S. 1947)
67 S.Ct. 1026.
81
See note 26, supra.
82
325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945).
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state legislation could not by means of restrictions upon unions and
their agents qualify or limit rights granted to them by the federal act.
In other words, state regulation could not stand "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 88 But the Court had previously in the Allen-Bradley case H
upheld the power of the State of Wisconsin to enact a labor relations
statute imposing restrictions upon union conduct, thus clearly holding
that the original NLRA did not by implication or otherwise foreclose
state regulations which supplemented those of the federal act. 85
In April, 1947, the Court handed down its decision in the Bethlehem 86 case in an opinion which created some confusion as to the federal-state problem. The question presented by this and its companion
case was whether the New York State Labor Relations Board could
38

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941), cited in the
Hill case. In the Hill case the Attorney General of Florida had sought and obtained an injunction restraining a union and its business agent from functioning as
such until they should comply with a Florida statute [Fla. Laws (1943) c. 21968, p.
565)] requiring that union agents be licensed and that unions file written reports
with the Secretary of State and pay an annual fee of one dollar. These requirements,
in the light of the sanction imposed, were held to be improper attempts to qualify
the collective bargaining rights of unions -and their representatives under the National Labor Relations Act. "Our holding is that the National Labor Relations Act
and §§ 4 and 6 of the Florida Act as here applied cannot 'move freely within the orbits
of their respective purposes without impinging upon one another.'" 325 U.S. 538
at 543•
.
84 Allen-Bradley Local No. l l l l v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942) •.
85
The illegal practices charged against the union in the Allen-Bradley case consisted of mass picketing, obstruction of and interference with entrance to and egress
from the employer's plant and with the free use of public ways, threats of injury to
person and property of employees, imposition of a permit requirement upon persons
·desiring to enter the plant, and picketing of homes of employees. Said the Court,
through Mr. Justice Douglas (pp. 748, 750-751.):
·
"We agree with the statement of the United States as amicus c1triae that the
federal A<;t was not designed to preclude a State from enacting legislation limited
to the prohibition or regulation of this type of employee or union activity. The Committee Reports ·on the federal Act plainly indicate that it is not 'a mere police court
measure' and that authority of the several States may be exerted to control such conduct. Furthermore, this Court has long insisted that an 'intention of Congress to
exclude States from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested.' •••
" • • • And we fail to see how the inability [ of the union] to utilize mass
picketing, threats, violence, and the other devices which were here employed impairs,
dilutes, qualifies or in any respect subtracts from any of the riglits guaranteed and
protected by the federal Act. Nor is the freedom to engage in such conduct shown
to be so essential or intimately related to a realization of the guarantees of the federal
Act that its denial is an impairment of the federal policy."
·
86 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, (U.S. 1947)
67 S.Ct. I026.
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require the Bethlehem and the Allegheny Ludlum companies, respectively, to grant bargaining rights to supervisory employees at a time
when the original NLRB, for policy reasons, would have denied foremen such rights.87 The decision was "that it is beyond the power of
New York State to apply its policy to these appellants as attempted
herein."
On its facts the case is easily understood simply as an application
of the doctrine that state regulation cannot be permitted to frustrate
national policy-in this situation a policy definitely adverse to foremen unionization, not merely neutral in the matter. However, as
pointed out in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion, "the Court's
opinion carries at least overtones of meaning that, regardless of the
consent of the National Board, New York is excluded from enforcing
rights of collective bargaining in all industries within its borders as to
which Congress has granted opportunity to invoke the authority of
the National Board." 88 The Court reached its conclusion without re87

The National Board's on-and-off-again treatment of this problem is sketched
in 44 M1cH. L. REV. 1089 at 1109-1112 (1946). By the time the case reached
the Supreme Court the board had reverted to the view that supervisory employees
were entitled to the rights of employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and
had been upheld in such decision by the Court. See supra, note 16.
88
67 S.Ct. 1026 at 1032. The Court's opinion conceded that "the subject
matter is not so 'intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government' that its nature alone raises an inference of exclusion [ of state
authority]," but, after very properly pointing out that the failure of the National
Board to entertain the union's petition took on "the character of a ruling that no
such regulation is appropriate or approved," it proceeded to use some language, quite
unnecessary to the decision, which can be read as a broad treatment of the federalstate problem. The portions of the opinion are the following (p. 103 l) :
"Comparison of the State and Federal statutes will show that both governments
have laid hold of the same relationship for regulation, and it involves the same
employers and the same employees. Each has delegated to an administrative authority
a wide discretion in applying this plan of regulation to specific cases, and they are
governed by somewhat different standards. Thus, if both laws are upheld, two administrative bodies are asserting a discretionary control over the same subject matter,
conducting hearings, supervising elections and determining appropriate units for bargaining in the same plant. They might come out with the same determination, or
they might come out with conflicting ones as they have in the past. • • • But the
power to decide a matter can hardly be made dependent on the way it is decided.
As said by Mr. Justice Holmes for the Court, 'When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition.••• ' Charleston
& W.C.R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604, 35 S.Ct. 715, 717.
• • • If the two boards attempt to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction to decide the
appropriate unit of representation, action by one necessarily denies the discretion of
the other. The second to act either must follow the first, which would make its action
useless and vain, or depart from it, which would produce a mischievous conflict. The
State argues for a rule that would enable it to act until the federal board had acted in
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liance upon section rn(a). Indeed, it stated that "Congress has not
seen fit to lay down even the most general of guides to construction
of the act, as it sometimes does, by saying that its regulation either shall
or shall not exclude state action." The intent to exclude state action
was. implied under the circumstances. Broa<der language was used in
the opinion than was necessary to the decision, i1;nd it is difficult to
believe that the Court would, if put to the test, have held subsequently
that cooperative enforcement by the states of policies conforming to
those of the National Board was no longer possible. Yet at least two
state courts have read the case as precluding any state board jurisdiction to decide representation matters with respect to employers
subject to the NLRA.80
the same case. But we do not think that a case by case test of federal• supremacy is permissible here. The federal board has jurisdiction of the,, industry in which these
particular employers are engaged and has asserted control of their labor relations in
general. It asserts, and rightfully so, under our decision in the Packard case, supra,
its power to decide whether these foremen may constitute themselves a bargaining
nnit. We do not believe this leaves room for the operation of the state authority
asserted."
Despite the breadth of this statement it is most important to remember that, as
the Court put it, the question, and the only question, before the Court was "whether,
Congress having undertaken to deal with the relationship between these companies
and their foremen, the State is prevented from doing so." (P. 1029.) If by Congressional action with respect to this relationship was meant the fact that the National
Board had decided, that, as a matter of federal policy, foremen should not have bargaining rights, the refusal to permit a contrary policy to be asserted under state law
was, as suggested in the text, simply an application of the doctrine of the Hill case.
On the other hand, if by Congressional action was meant the fact that the federal
statute broadly encompassed all representation questions in connection with collective
bargaining, including those with respect to foremen, and vested in the National
Board such a large measure of discretion as to detail that consistent federal and state
action with respect to representation matters was improbable, the case could either be
regarded as a broad application of the doctrine of the Hill case to all representation
matters,. or, perhaps, as an enunciation of a rule of complete supersedure as to labor
relations matters touched by the federal statute as possibly implied in the above quoted
portion of the opinion.
89
Re Pittsburgh Railways Company, (Pa. Com. Pl., Sept. 29, I 947) I 3 Lab.
Cas., 1f 64,028; LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, (Wis. C. C., April 28, 1947) 12 Lab. Cas:, 1f 63,795. However, the circuit
court's decision in the LaCrosse case was reversed December 23, 1947, by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the state board's jurisdiction was' upheld (13 Lab. Cas.,
1f 64,208). For earlier Wisconsin cases involving the federal-state problem see: Wisconsin L.R.B. v. Fred Reuping Co., 228 Wis. 473, 279 N.W. 672 (1938); AllenBradley Local l II l v. Wisconsin E.R.B., 237 Wis. 164, 295 N.W. 791 (1941);
UAW v. Wisconsin E.R.B., 245 Wis. 417, 14 N.W. (2d) 872 (1944); IBEW v.
Wisconsin E.R.B., 245 Wis. 532, 15 N.W. (2d) 823 (1944); Publii:; S.E. Union
v. Wisconsin E.R.B., 246 Wis. 190, 16 N.W. (2d) 823 (1944); and Intl. Union v.
Wisconsin E.R.B., 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W. (2d) 875 (1947). The Wisconsin court's
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Legislative History of Section zo(a) of the Amended NLRA.
The legislative history of the present act in some respects tends to
support the construction of section ro( a) which would deny to the
states jurisdiction of the subject matter touched by the amended
NLRA except as otherwise expressly provided. This is especially true
of the pertinent portions of the Report of the House Committee on
Education and Labor on H.R. 3020, section ro(a) of which provided:
"The Board is empowered, as.hereinafter provided, to adjudicate complaints of unfair labor practices a:ffecting commerce filed
by the Administrator. Such power of the Board shall be exclusive." 40
The committee indicated that it thought the "exclusive" jurisdiction which would thereby be given to the board necessitated a special
provision giving the states "a concurrent jurisdiction in respect of
closed shop and other union-security arrangements," and it referred
to the act as an "illustration" of the policy calling, for uniformity in
"matters of national policy under the commerce clause." It said that
"since by the Labor Act Congress preempts the field that the act
covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the act is concerned, .•• " the saving provision was necessary.41
The Senate Committee Report of S. rr26, section ro(a) of which
was substantially in the form finally _incorporated in the act,4 2 referred
interpretation of the Bethlehem case is indicated by the following from its opinion
in the last cited case (p. 567):
''What the court held was that the National Labor Relations Board had exercised
the jurisdiction delegated to it under the federal act by declining to designate the
foreman as a bargaining unit. The declination was an exercise of its jurisdiction, just
as much as granting it would have been. The jurisdiction vested in the National Labor
Relations Board was to determine whether it would designate the foreman as a bargaining unit, and it exercised jurisdiction when it denied the application •••• There
was a direct conflict in the Bethlehem Steel Co. case. The National Labor Relations
Board had determined that foremen could not form a unit for collective bargaining
and the state b_oard said that they could and formed such a unit. The National Labor
Relations Board's decision barred the state board from taking any action at all."
Thus, the view of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was in accord with the interpretation of the Bethlehem case suggested in the text. The Court's position with
respect to representation matters, as stated in its opinion in the LaCrosse case, was that
" ••• although the National Board's power over that subject is paramount, it is not
exclusive in such a case as we have here [where the Board had not acted], until the
Federal power is exercised or jurisdiction thereto is taken as to particular employees."
For a general discussion of the Wisconsin cases see 1946 Wis. L. REv. 193.
40
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess.
41
House Rep. No. 205, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 40, 44 (April 11, 1947).
42
Section IO(a) of S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess., provided:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
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to the section briefly to say that, the proviso was added to permit the
NLRB "to allow State labor-relations boards to take final jurisdiction
of cases in border-line industries ( that is, border-line insofar as interstate commerce is concerned), provided the State statute conforms to
national policy." The Conference Report makes it apparent that the
Conference Committee accepted the Senate's version of the first part
of section ro(a) in order to make it clear that the damage and injunction provisions of the LMRA, while depriving the NLRB of exclusive
jurisdiction, would not operate to cut off the administrative remedy. 43
Neither this Report nor the Senate Committee Report made reference
to the problem of state jurisdiction absent a specific cession of jurisdiction by the NLRB.
This failure to discuss the problem of concurrent state jurisdiction in reference to the Senate Bill leaves the intentions of the draftsmen in some doubt. But it must be conceded, in the view of the House
Committee's statement, that there is somewhat more in the record
against than in favor of a construction which would permit the states
to act, as to matters touched by the federal act, either in the case of
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
Been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board
is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to concede to
such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry, other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation, except where predominantly local in character
even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, provided the
State agency conforms to national policy, as herein defined, in the determination of
such di~putes."
It is interesting to note that this provision used the word "concede," whereas
the final enactment uses the word "cede." The words are not precisely synonymous.
Each can be used to mean "surrendering" or "granting," and the word "cede" is
restricted to this meaning. But the word "concede" can also be taken to mean "to
admit to be true" or "to acknowledge" (see WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL D1cTIONARY, 2d ed.). The use of "concede," in this sense, would have been exactly in
accordance with the interpretation of section rn(a) which is contended for in the text.
It can be argued, of course, that in substituting. "cede" for "concede" in the final
bill the intention was to make it clear that the board was to be empowered not simply
to acknowledge state jurisdiction, but, rather, to grant it, which would imply that in
the absence of a "cession" there' was to be no state jurisdiction except as otherwise
expressly provided. However, the Conference Committee. Report made no point of
the change in terminology, and stated simply that the Committee had adopted the
Senate provision. See note 23, supra.
43 See note 23, supra. At least one federal district court thinks that one effect of
these changes in section 1o(a) is that the statute must now be taken as conferring
private rights on unions, as well as others, with the result that unions may proceed
against employer unfair labor practices by civil suit in the federal courts. See Textile
Workers Union of America v. Amazon Cotton Mill Co., (D.C. N.C. December 29,
1947) 21 LAB. REL. REP. MAN. 2166.
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the major industries, or, independently of a cession of jurisdiction, in
the case of the minor industries. At the same time note should again
be taken of the ambiguity of section Io( a). If it had been intended
to suspend the operation of the state police power in the field of
management-union relations, except as otherwise expressly provided
or as necessarily implied it would seem that clear language to this end
would have been used in view of the importance of the result. Legislators who were trying to produce some "equity" or "balance" in the
federal labor relations law cannot reasonably be credited with an unexpressed intention to free unions ( or for that matter employers) from
state restrictions/"

The Adjustment of Federal-State Relations in Other Areas
It would be appropriate, in considering the problem of federalism
with respect to the Taft-Hartley Act, to make an extended examination
of the statutory and judicial treatment of the subject in other legislative
areas. The question as to the effect of federal legislation upon state
power has arisen many times, with diverse results. 45 Attempts have
H It may be suggested that since the Taft-Hartley Act represents a lqng and carefully deliberated attempt to deal comprehensively with the national labor relations
problem, Congress must be deemed to have _rejected, as to all persons subject to federal
power, all the proposals which were not incorporated in the act, and that such rejection must be taken as tantamount to a decision that there should be no regulations,
either federal or state, of the kinds rejected. It is submitted that this reasoning is
patently fallacious. It is one thing to examine the legislative process of proposal and
rejection for the purpose of r~olving ambiguities in the particular statute finally enacted.
It is quite another thing to say that every proposal considered and rejected for federal
purposes has been "disenacted" for state purposes as well. Would it be seriously urged
that if, for example, the State of Michigan has adopted a certain method of dealing
with a problem, and its representatives in Congress have unsuccessfully advocated that
Congress adopt the same procedure on a national scale, there arises a logical inference
that the Michigan statute is invalidated absent anything to the contrary in the enacted
federal statute? Any such canon of interpretation of Congressional lawmaking would
magnify silence or inaction by Congress to terrific proportions. Congress would always
find it necessary, in legislating in a federal-state area, to make an express disavowal of
its intention to forbid state adoption of each of the various proposals which it has
considered. The fact is that Congressional failure to adopt a proposal made to it is
ordinarily the result of a complex of factors, not the least of which is the interaction
of purely political forces, and normally reflects no adverse judgment upon slmilar
legislation for the states.
5
" See the cases collected and cited in DowLING, CASES ON C~NSTITUTIONAL LAw,
3d ed., c. 7 (1946), especially section 4. See also Bikle, "The Silence of Congress," 41
HARV. L. REV. 200 (1927); Dowling, "Interstate Commerce and State Power," VA.
L. REV. I (1940); and Braden, "Umpire to the Federal System," IO UNiv. Cm. L.
REV. 27 (1942).
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been made both by the Supreme Court and by commentators to
rationalize these results in terms of legal dogma. 46 A survey of these
efforts, and of a fair proportion, at least, of the cases forces one to
agree with the recent statement that "no abstract formula can resolve
the problems of federalism implicit in such a situation." 47
The fact seems to be that in a given situation cases c.an be marshalled to support almost any desired result. The commentator quoted
above finds in the decisions as a whole "a trend of increased judicial
intolerance of state interference in fields which are in some degree
under feaeral control" and "by a process of separating the tangled
strands of judicial thought" he discerns three tests for "occupation of
the field " namely "the conflict test " "the coincidence test" and "the
' test." 48' Another recent writer,
'
preclusion
supposedly nurtured in an
atmosphere of legal realism, suggests that of late "increasing weight
has been given to the practJce and opinions of the appropriate federal
administrative agencies," 49 relying especially upon the Court's very
recent decisions in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation 50 and Rice
v. Chicago Board of Trade. 51 Perhaps still different analyses are
possible.
46
The most comprehensive recent attempts by the Court are to- be found in
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, (U.S. 1947) 67 S.Ct.
1026 and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., (U.S. 1947) 67 S.Ct. II46.
47 60 HARv. L. REV. 262 (1946). In H.P. Welch Co. v. New H.ampshire, 306
U.S. 79 at 84, 59 S.Ct. 438 (1939), Justice Butler said: "Our decisi<fus provide no
formula for discovering implied effect on federal statutes upon state measures such as
that under consideration."
48
60 HARV. L. REV. 262 at 263, 265-266 (1946).

49
50

0

L. J. 1265 (19-47).
(U.S. 1947) 67 S.Ct. u46. In this case the Court held that a public grain
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warehouseman licensed _by the Secretary of Agriculture under the United States
Warehouse Act [7 U.S.C. (1940) § 241 et seq.] was not subject to regulation as to
its rates under the Illinois law. Much was made in the Court's opinion of the change
made in section 29 of the federal act [7 U.S.C. § 269] by the 1931 amendments of
the act of 1916. Section 29 of the original act made it perfectly clear that there
was intended to be no impairment of state jurisdiction. As the section presently
standi;; by virtue of the I 93 I amendments, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized
in his discretion to cooperate with state officials charged with the enforcement of state
laws relating to warehouses, but it adds that "the power, jurisdiction, and authority
conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this chapter shall be exclusive with
respect to all persons securing a license hereunder so long as said license remains in
effect." The Court, with considerable justification, read this legislative history as indicating Congressional intent to preclude state jurisdiction with respect to federally
licensed warehouses.
51
(U.S. 1947) 67 S.Ct. u6o. Here it was held that the Federal Commodity
Exchange Act [7 U.S.C. (1940) § I et seq.] does not work an automatic supersedure
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In any case the state of the precedents is clearly not such as to
dictate a decision either for or against pro tanto supersedure of state
authority by the Taft-Hartley Act. A 1922 observation of the work
of the Supreme Court in this field by Professor Powell is still pertinent: "The court has drawn its lines where it has drawn them because it has thought it wise to draw them there. The wisdom of its
wisdom depends upon a judgment about practical matters and not upon
a knowledge of the Constitution." 52 It is, in essence, this "judgment
about practical matters" which is at stake in the problem here presented.

II
BAsis FOR RESOLVING SPECIFIC OuEsTIONs AS TO STATE PowER

It is submitted that neither the language of the Taft-Hartley Act
nor its legislative background, including the treatment of federal-state
relations under the original NLRA, requires the holding that state
power is suspended with respect to management-union relations of persons subject to the federal act, except that, in the case of the major
industries, a proper construction of section 1o(a) of Title I would
appear to indicate preemption as to the specific kinds of subject matter
covered by the amended NLRA. Nor does the Supreme Court's disposition of the federal-state problem in other fields of legislation rest
on any general policy which would require that doubts should here be
resolved against state authority. As urged at the outset, the best i~terests of the nation will be served by preserving insofar as possible the
opportunity for local experimentation in labor legislation, subject to the
necessary limitation that local policy shall not operate to frustrate national policy. The incidence of management, union and employee conduct, although frequently severe enough to be of national concern, is
nevertheless always important to the locality.
The following working hypothesis is therefore suggested, as a
reasonable reconciliation between the general objective of state freedom, the limitation necessary to secure full e:ffectiveness of national
policies and the special treatment of the major industries apparently
required by section 1o(a) of the amended NLRA: (1) As to the
of state authority to regulate the practices of grain exchanges, and that the Commodity
Exchange Act invalidates only those specific regulations, if any, imposed by the states
upon grain exchanges which are or may be in direct conflict with federal regulations.
2
G Powell, "Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Police
Power, 1910-1914, II," 22 CoL. L. REv. 28, 48 (1922).
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minor but·n~t as to the major industries, the states should be deemed
to be free to enforce policies in the areas covered by the amended
NLRA, so long as state policy does not collide with national policy;
( 2) as to all persons subject to the LMRA the states should be deemed
to be free to enforce policies supplementary to and not in conflict with
those defined in Titles II and III of the LMRA, and, except to the
extent necessary to carry out the federal policy of exclusive jurisdiction under Title I in. the case of the major industries, to enact nonconflicting regulations even in areas covered by Titles II and III. It
remains to suggest more specifically the extent to which state policies
presently in effect could be enforced in the light of this general formula. The views stated will be put conditionally, since their validity
depends upon acceptance of the analysis above set forth.

(1) Application of Provisions Making Employer Anti-Union
Practices Unlawful
The state labor relations acts without exception make unlawful certain kinds of employer practices which are deemed to constitute interferences with the "right" of self-organization of employees. In general these provisions are modeled on section 8 of the original NLRA
and therefore resemble those defined in section 8 (a) of the amended
NLRA, since the latter retains the general outline of the former statute.
As to the major industries ( those as to which there may be no
cession of jurisdiction to the states by the National Board)-the state
regulations would not be applicable, siµce Congress has exclusively
occupied this field. However, state statutes and common law doctrine
imposing more se:vere restrictions upon the use of union security provisions than are prescribed in the amended NLRA would be applicable
by virtue of the express reservation contained in section 14(b) of the
act.
As to the minor industries-the state regulations would be applicable, up to the point of actual conflict or interference with any of
the federal rules. Thus, for example; a state court could not properly
hold an employer publication concerning unionism to be less privileged
than it is under the federal act; 53 nor could the employer be compelled
under state law to accord bargaining rights to supervisory employees.
58

Section 8{c) of the act provides: "The expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written; printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.".
·
·
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(2) Application of Provisions Making Certain Types of Union
Collective Action Unlawful
Most of the state labor relations acts, a variety of miscellaneous
statutes and a considerable body of traditional common law doctrine
deal variously with union collective action taking such forms as the
strike, the boycott, picketing, fraud, violence and intimidation. Civil,
criminal, and, in some cases, administrative remedies are provided.
As to the major industries-state law would not be applicable except possibly with respect to strike action and except for the authority
to regulate in areas which are not covered by the federal act, and then
only so long as the results would not be inconsistent with rights assured or duties imposed by the LMRA. There undoubtedly remains
in the states under any interpretation of the act the authority to exercise their inherent police powers to protect person and property
against acts of violence, and on this basis state statutes outlawing such
activities as the sit-down strike, mass picketing, and violence in any
form may be sustained. The existence of state power to impose restrictions on peaceful strike action would be more questionable. On the
analysis proposed, the authority to impose requirements such as "cooling off" periods and employee referendums would have to rest on the
interpretation placed on section I3. If, as is possible, this section should
not be construed as an express reservation of authority to the states
to limit the "right" to strike, it would probably have to be concluded
that, since the federal act touches this area, the power of the states is
withdrawn, except to enforce_ in their courts the civil liability imposed
with respect to certain kinds of strike action by section 303 of the
LMRA. The only basis upon which state authority could be upheld
would be on the theory that the state regulation is supplementary to
federal regulation in an area not covered by federal law, but this argument would rest on very dubious refinements which would hardly be
tenable if the "occupancy of the field" concept is to have any practical
meaning.G 4 Of cou,rse, the states are free, even in the case of the major
H It is possible to contend, both with respect to employer anti-union activities and
with respect to restrictions upon union collective action, that more is being read into
section IO(a) of the amended NLRA than was intended. The argument would be
that, although Congress clearly intended to make its remedial system exclusive in the
case of the major industries, there is no reason to infer from this that the states were to
be forbidden to protect the public interest by means of penal sanctions, or, through
their courts, to vindicate private interests by means of civil remedies. There is obviously some merit in this position. However, it seems to me that it does not, on the whole,
give to section 10(a) the importance which it deserves. Why would Congress have
denied any authority in the states to use an administrative procedure to deal with unfair
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industries, by virtue of section r4(b) of the' amended NLRA, to restrict
the use of union security provisions.
As to the minor industries-state law would be applicable, subject,
again, to the requirement that federal policies must not be frustrated.
This disposition of state regulation of collective action implies, of
course, that the states may impose sanctions upon collective action without depriving workers of rights guaranteed to them by the federal act.
Section 7 of the amended NLRA purports to grant to employees
the right to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," and it may be contended
that state action in any wise restricting collective action cannot stand
in the light of this "guaranteed" federal right. In answer it is sufficient
to point out that the Supreme Court settled this question adversely to
the contention when it upheld Wisconsin's regulation of mass picketing
in the Allen-Bradley case. 55 The proper view is that section 7 is simply
a declaration of principle· which gains specific content only as it is
reinforced by the specific prohibitions of the act which are directed
against employers.
One question which is a little troublesome is whether the guarantee
contained in section 7 of the amended NLRA is such as to preclude
disciplinary action by the employer on account of employee participation in forms of collective action which, within the limitations suggested
above, are legally prohibited by state law.. The difficulty is pointed
up by the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hamilton
56
'V. NLRB,
in which an NLRB order requiring the employer to reinstate certain discharged employees was upheld and enforced over the
objection that the employees had forfeited-the protection of the original
NLRA by their non-compliance with the "cooling-off" strike pro57
visions of the 1939 Michigan Labor
. Mediation Act. The Court did
labor practices while permitting them to treat such practices as criminal acts? Is it not
more reasonable to construe section 1o(a) as an indication that Congress intended with
respect to the major industries to set forth a single, uniform national policy as to subject
matter covered by the NLRA, necessitated by the national interest in promoting and
protecting the .flow of interstate commerce? If, however, this interpretation should be
rejected, and the position above suggested should be accepted, some of the specific conclusions with respect to state power mentioned in the text would have to be altered. For
example, it would not then be necessary to rely on section 13 in order to find authority
in the states to impose "cooling off periods" and employee referendums as legal prerequisites on strike action.
55 Allen-Bradley Local No. IIII v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U.S. 740, 6z S.Ct. 820 (1941).
56
(C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 160 F. (zd) 456.
57
Public Act No. 17.6, Mich. Laws (1939).
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not find it necessary to construe the Michigan Act ( as to whether or
not it authorized the discharge of these employees), since "a construction authorizing the discharge of strikers who failed to give the
required notice and failed to observe the cooling-off period conflicts
with the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and would
not be applicable in this case." It reached this conclusion in reliance on
Hill v. Florida, and it cited the Allen-Bradley case in which the
Supreme Court, after upholding the Wisconsin Act, said: "If the order
of the state Board affected the status of the employees, or if it caused
a forfeiture of collective bargaining rights, a distinctly different question would arise." ~8
With due respect, it is submitted that the Sixth Circuit's analysis
of the problem was incorrect. The employer there had not acted under
express state statutory authority in discharging the workers involved.
He had exercised what he thought were his normal management rights.
An employer may, of course, discharge an employee for any cause
deemed by him to be sufficient--subject only to any limitations on
that right contained in an applicable collective agreement or federal
or state law. The original NLRA did not operate to prevent such discharges unless they constituted an interference with a right guaranteed
by section 7. But to say that such discharges were within section 7
simply because the employees had engaged in a form of union activity
proves too much. Such a theory would have left the employer helpless to rid his plant of undesirables, however serious their misconduct,
so long as their misconduct was union action. Under this view even
violations of a contract "no strike" pledge could not have been the
basis for discharge. This would have been a shocking result, and the
decisions under the original NLRA in the Fansteel, American News
and Sands cases show that that act was not to be given such a construction. 59 Nor could a different view properly be taken of the present
act, which itself condemns as illegal certain types of collective action.
It is therefore submitted that the federal act does not cloak all
kinds of union action with immunity as against discharge or discipline,
of the employees involved, and the only question remaining is whether
there is such immunity in cases where the employees have violated
prohibitions of state law. The test, so far as the discrimination provisions of the amended NLRA are concerned, should be simply
whether the discharges have been motivated by the desire to discourage
58

Allen-Bradley Local No. l l l l v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 3 l 5
U.S. 740 at 751, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1941).
59
See notes 17, 18 and 19, supra.
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membership in the union, or /whether, on the other hand, the employer had "just cause" within the customs and conventions obtaining
in his plant. Obviously the NLRB has the right to make the decision
on this matter if the employe~s or their union want to make a case.
Similarly, where the discharge or suspension is required by state statute,
it is the function of the NLRB to determine whether the sanction in
" of the NLRA. But it
the circumstances conflicts with the policies
would be incorrect to say that the federal statute on its face precludes
terminations of employment based on conduct made illegal by state
law.

(3) Settlement of Representation Questions
The state labor relations acts without· exception follow the lead
of the federal legislation in ma_king provision for administrative determination of questions concerning the right of a labor organization to
represent ~mployees for purposes of collective bargaining. The question is whether, under the suggested disposition of the federal-state
problem, such authority may be exercised with respect to employees
covered by the federal act.
As to the major industries-state board action would be excluded,
since Congress has-preempted this :field to the National Board.
As to the minor industries-state board action would be excluded
here also. On the basic analysis which is suggested, a state board could
proceed with respect to such an industry so long as no. conflict or inconsistency with federal policy would be involved. Howeyer, the
·existing state and federal statutory provisions d~aling with the representation problem are so divergent that conflict would seem to be
inevitable. The Taft-Hartley Act made substantial changes in the
federal law relating to the handling of representation matters, both
substantive and procedural, with the result ·that the federal policy
with respect to the settlement of representation questions is more
sharply defined, than before. Some of the substantive differences between the federal provisions and those of the state labor relations acts
are cited in the footnote. 60 Even if, in a given case, it could be shown
60

Among the substantive differences existing between the amended NLRA and
one or more of the state acts are the following: (I) A single plant may be the broadest
possible bargaining unit under the state act (for example, Michigan), whereas under
the NLRA the unit may be multiple plant or company wide; (2) under the state
act the state board may be compelled to continue in effect bargaining units identified by
past practice, or to give separate representation to crafts of employees, whereas under
the NLRA there is no similar mandate; (3) under the state act individual employees
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that the National and State Board definitions of the appropriate unit
would be the same, the differences between federal and state acts with
respect to procedures to be followed and the rights and privileges of
employees and unions following certification are such as to indicate
that certification under state law would not fully effectuate the policies
of the federal act. 61 This being so, the principle of the Hill and Bethlehem cases appears to preclude state jurisdiction.

(4) Mediation and Arbitration
State mediation facilities are provided by most of the states either
on a voluntary or a compulsory basis. A large number of the states
facilitate the voluntary arbitration of labor disputes by statutory aids.
Compulsory arbitration of public utility labor disputes is provided in
some dozen states. On the federal level mediation is provided for on
a voluntary and discretionary basis by Title 11 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, and the same title also provides for the use of fact finding bodies
and temporary federal court injunctions in the case of national emergencies, in the discretion of the President.
State mediation, when employed in the absence of federal mediation, in no way conflicts with these federal policies. Even concurrent
may (and in most cases do) have a, right of individual presentation of grievances,
whereas under the NLRA the union interest is safeguarded by the grant of the opportunity to be heard in connection with the adjustment of the individual's grievance;
(4) supervisory employees may or may not be granted bargaining rights under the
state act, and the classification may or may not be defined as in the federal act, whereas
under the federal act such employees, as defined, have no bargaining rights; (5) plant
guards and professional employees may be included in a bargaining unit along with
other classes of employees under the state act, whereas under the amended NLRA
they may not be included except under specific conditions.
61
Among the "procedural" differences existing between the amended NLRA and
one or more of the state acts are the following: (I) There may be no provision for
representation hearings under the state act, whereas they are mandatory under the
federal act; (z.) the expense of elections may be chargeable to the parties under the
state act, not so under the NLRA; (3) the state act may not give any specific tenure to
a certified union, whereas tenure is in effect one year at least under the federal act;
(4) the state act may not contain any provision for "decertification" of a union,
whereas this is provided for by the NLRA; (5) the state act may not make specific
provision for "run-off" elections, as does the NLRA, or may make different provision than does the NLRA; (6) the state act may. deal with the question of the
voting rights_ of various classes of employees differently than does tlie NLRA; (7) the
state act may not condition the right of resort to the act upon the filing of noncommunist affidavits or the making of financial and other reports, as does the NLRA;
(8) the state act may limit the state board's authority to deal with "jurisdictional"
controversies in a manner not provided for in the NLRA; (9) the state act may limit
the right of an employer to file representation petitions in a manner inconsistent
with that provided for in the federal act.
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federal and state mediation is not impossible, as experience has shown,
although it may be desirable to avoid "too many :fingers in the pie."
It may be contended that, where state mediation is compulsory, the
pl_"ocess involves some interference with the freedom of the parties to
bargain collectively, but this is hardly correct, since mediation customarily occurs after bargaining has broken down. State mediation is
clearly contemplated under the federal act as to contract renegotiation
disputes, as is shown by section 8 ( d) of the amended NLRA, and as
62
tp all classes of minor disputes, as is clear from section 203(b).
In
other types of cases the hypothesis on which we are proceeding might
be thought to require -that a line be drawn between the major and
minor industries, with state mediation authority excluded in the case
of the former. However, the differentiation between these two classes
of industries rests on the interpretation which hru; been placed upon
section 1o(a) of the amended NLRA, which, as differentiated from
the other titles of the Taft-Hartley Act, can hardly be said to enter
or occupy the :field of mediation. At most, Title I recognizes the
existence of the mediation procedures available under federal and
state authority, and there is nothing in Title II of the LMRA to
suggest a withdrawal of state authority to mediate all classes of disputes.
Nor would resort to voluntary arbitration under state procedures
as a means of settling labor disputes, other than representation questions, contravene any federal policy or stand in any light other than as
supplementary thereto. Rather, it should be commended as a desirable
amicable and orderly way of__preventing disruptions of interstate commerce. The same should be said of compulsory arbitration of public
utility disputes under state law insofar as the essentially "local" communications and transportation industries are concerned. However,
with respect to the major utilities in these :fields there arises the same
kind of question here which was discussed in connection with state
restrictions upon peaceful strike action, since a system of compulsory
arbitration necessarily involves a suspension of the "right" to strike,
Section I 3 of the amended NLRA can be read as saving to the states
the power to deal with strikes, but if it should not be so construed,
the analysis on which we are proceeding would probably require the
conclusion that the states are without power to impose compulsory
62 The Federal Mediation and Gonciliation Service is now in the process of
negotiating working arrangements with the various state authorities in charge of
mediation. For the agreement reached with the Massachusetts and California authorities
see C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.,
9004- \Ind 9005.
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arbitration procedures upon the major utilities and their unions. As
a matter of fact the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act supports to some extent the view that Congress examined into and rejected as undesirable this method of attempting to secure industrial
peace. 63 If, on the other hand, as would seem to be preferable, the
states should be held to be free under section r 3 to restrict strike
action, it would be proper to· regard compulsory arbitration as a
form of regulation supplementary to, and not covered by, the amended
NLRA. Only in the case of those major utility disputes of such
nationwide importance as to cause the emergency provisions of Title II
of the LMRA to be invoked would it then be held that state compulsory arbitration provisions are suspended. In such a situation
federal fact finding and state arbitration procedures would probably
be incompatible.

(5) Regulation of Union Internal Affairs
The problem of setting standards to which unions and their officers must conform with respect to such matters as the admission and
expulsion of members, the election and powers of officers, and the
control and disposition of union property has been approached very
gingerly by the courts and the legislatures. But limited controls are
exercised through the courts, and some statutes, such as the fair practices acts, have been enacted to supplement these judicial controls. On
the other hand, the Taft-Hartley Act has entered this field in a limited
way ( r) by conditioning the union shop privilege under the amended
NLRA on the filing of non-communist affidavits and the submission of
financial reports and other data, and on the charging of reasonable
initiation fees, 64 and ( 2) in Title III by prohibiting union political
expenditures and contributions.65
Does the fact that Congress has imposed these limited controls
mean that state authority to regulate union affairs is superseded? The
63 With respect to Title II of S. I I 26, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., April 17, 1947 stated the following (p. 28):
"This title contemplates not only a reorganization of the existing Federal
machinery for the mediation and conciliation of labor disputes but also prescribes a
procedure for the guidance of the Service and the parties to disputes. The theory
of this section is that it is not desirable in an economy such as ours for the Federal
Government to play a partisan role with respect to disputes between management and
labor and that compulsory arbitration is not an effective or desirable method to be
employed."
64
Sections Sa (3), 8 (b) ( 2), 9 ( f) and 9 (g) of the amended NLRA.
65
Section 304 of the LMRA.
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hypothesis on which these general conclusions rest makes it possible
to answer this question in the affirmative, in the case of unions operating in.the major industries,- on the theory that the amended NLRA
touches this general subject. This, however; would clearly be an
absurd result. It would mean that the enactment of a few indirect
controTs, made effective through a withdrawal of privileges under the
federal act, operates to preclud~ any direct attack by the states upon
the entire range of internal union problems. This cannot be the case.
It is unthinkable that the Supreme Court would hold, for example,
that because Congress has merely denied the privilege of the union
shop to a union which indulges in race discrimination, the states are
forbidden to attack such discrimination directly by making it illegal,
or that-because Congress has dealt thus indirectly with the problems of
discrimination, communism and financial reports, the states are without
power to legislate with respect to such other and even more serious
matters as autocracy within unions. It would be sensible here, despite
some lack of consistency in approach, to say that Congress has not
really entered th~ field of internal union affairs, and hence that the
states are free to act, so long, of course, as state action does not, as it
did in the Florida regulations involved in the Hill case, impose sanctions which operate to deprive workers of the rights of representation
assured to them by the federal act.

* * *
The more one considers the extremely complicated problems of
federalism thrown up so acutely by the Taft-Hartley Act, the more
diffident he is likely to become concerning the expression of an opinion
· concer~ing the solution of these problems. On reflection over what is
written above the writer has an uncomfortable feeling that he has left a
good many specific points dangling in the thin air of alternative
premises, inferences and hypotheses. However, the alternatives are
necessarily present, as the statute is formulated, and a statement of
them will perhaps have been useful whether or not the specifically
suggested solutions are accepted. It is clear that there remains, despite the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,
some room for state action in- the field of management-union relations.
The exact size and shape of the space reserved to the states depends
on the tools selected by those empowered to make the measurements,
and this selection will most certainly be made in the light of the
projected result.

